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Some Comments on Contracts and
the California Commercial Code
By Raymond G. Coyne*
CALIFORNIA'S VERSION of the Commercial Code' was enacted in June of
1963 and became effective on January 1, 1965. This article is an attempt
to answer in a general way the natural question posed by so many since
its enactment-what does the Commercial Code do to the law of con-
tracts? The question is reasonable and the answer is short-not much.
But the Commercial Code does bring about some changes in contract law
and cases governed by the Commercial Code are in the California courts.
It might be prudent therefore to examine the changes in contract law
brought about by this Code.
The first thing to be noted is that the Commercial Code, insofar as
general contract law is concerned, is largely limited in its application to
contracts for the sale of goods. It does not make any changes in the law:relating to other types of contracts, e.g. contracts for services, contracts
for the sale of real property or construction contracts. Since, as to those
contracts not specifically covered by the Commercial Code the law has
not been changed, this means that we probably will see two bodies of
contract law develop, one with respect to the sale of goods and the other
with respect to the rest. This raises. another question. Will the Uniform
Commercial Code2 extend its influence beyond the commercial area and
gradually bring about a change in the law applicable to those contracts
now beyond its ken? This question will perforce be answered in time by
the bench and the bar and others who contribute to shaping the law.
The Commercial Code does not seem to have changed the basic con-
cept of what a contract is. True, the Commercial Code defines the terms
"agreement"' and "contract"4 and differentiates between them. "Agree-
ment" for example means ".... the bargain of the parties.... ." "Contract"
means ". . the total legal obligation which results from the parties'
agreement.... ." But when these definitions are read together they incor-
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1 California's Commercial Code contains some 125 variations from the Official Text of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
2 Adopted in at least 41 states and the District of Columbia as of this writing.
3 Cal. Comm. Code §1201(3).
4 Cal. Comm. Code §1201(11).
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porate the provisions of current California law defining the term "con-
tract."5 In addition the Commercial Code makes express reference to the
existing body of California law concerning contracts, equity, capacity,
agency, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake and
the like, as supplementing the Commercial Code unless specifically dis-
placed by the provisions of that code.' Thus, it is clear that the Com-
mercial Code was not intended to make obsolete the entire common law
of contracts even with respect to those contracts subject to the Commer-
cial Code. It is also clear that insofar as the basic concept of contract is
concerned, those contracts subject to the Commercial Code and those
which are not, are alike.
Aside from contracts for the sale of goods, which used to be covered
in the Sales Act provision of the Civil Code, California law concerning
offer and acceptance and mutual assent, though codified, is in line with
the common law. An offer, for example, must be definite and certain
before it can be accepted and thus form a contract.7 The Commercial
Code, on the other hand, would allow the formation of a contract even
though the offer was not definite and certain since by its terms a contract
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intend to make a contract
and if there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.8 Here contracts for the sale of goods and contracts not covered
by the Commercial Code part company, and whether they will come
together again is conjectural. The Commercial Code provision is based
upon the intent of the parties to make a contract and the requirement
that there be a reasonably certain basis for granting an appropriate
remedy. These qualifications have their origins in commercial practices
which would not seem applicable in the non-commercial setting and it
may well be that this twain shall not meet again.
With regard to acceptance, there are some differences between con-
tracts subject to the Commercial Code and those which are not. But first,
a point of similarity should be noted. The Commercial Code' provides
that unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by language or circum-
stances, an offer is to be construed as inviting acceptance in any matter
, Cal. Civ. Code §§1549 (contract defined), 1619, 1620, 1621 (express and implied con-
tracts) ; Cf. Restatement, Contracts §§1, 3 (1932).
6 Cal. Comm. Code §§1201(3), 1201(11), 1103.
7 Cal. Civ. Code §§1565, 1580; Burgess v. Rodom, 121 Cal.App.2d 71, 262 P.2d 335 (1953)
Restatement, Contracts §32 (1932).
8 Cal. Comm. Code §2204(3), as to price of goods, however, if the offer or contract does
not settle the price the Commercial Code does. Cal. Comm. Code §2305.
0 Cal. Comm. Code §2206(1) (a).
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and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances. The provision was
deliberately drafted in this manner to avoid the application of any rule
to the effect that the mode of communicating the acceptance must be the
same as that used for the offer and is intended to be flexible enough to
apply to acceptances by present and future means of communication. It
has its counterpart in the Civil Code provision ° which requires the
acceptance to conform to any prescribed conditions concerning communi-
cation which are contained in the offer. In the absence of any such condi-
tions, "any reasonable and usual mode may be adopted." Actually both
of these provisions are in accord with the common law rule.11
However, the Commercial Code in the same section'12 provides that an
order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment can be
accepted by a prompt promise to ship or by prompt shipment of conform-
ing or nonconforming goods. To the extent that this section permits
acceptance by either prompt promise to ship or prompt shipment of
conforming goods it appears that there has been no change in California
law. 3 But insofar as this section provides that an offer to buy goods can
be accepted by shipping nonconforming goods we have new contract law
in California.
In another section of the Commercial Code 4 there is a change as to
acceptance in contract law applicable to the sale of goods. This section
states that a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation operates as an acceptance even though it contains terms in
addition to or different from those contained in the offer, unless the
acceptance itself is expressly made conditional on the further acceptance
of the additional terhs by the original offeror. Absent any such condition
the additional terms become proposals for addition to the contract and
presumably these proposals must be assented to before they become a
part of the contract. As may be seen from the foregoing an acceptance or
written confirmation containing additional terms can have a twofold effect.
It is an acceptance so that a contract is formed according to the terms of
the original offer and it is also in the nature of a counteroffer to the extent
that it contains proposals for addition to the contract already formed.
It should be noted here that what has been said above concerning pro-
posals for additions to the contract applies only in cases where at least
one of the parties to the contract is not a merchant.
10 Cal. Civ. Code §1582; Davis v. Jacoby, 1 Cal.2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934).
11 See e.g., Henthorn v. Fraser, 2 Ch. App. 27 (1892) ; Restatement, Contracts §66 (1932).12 Cal. Comm. Code §2206(1) (b).
13 Beatty v. Oakland Sheet Metal Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 53, 244 P.2d 25 (1952).
14 Cal. Comm. Code §2207.
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There is another standard applied as between merchants." In this case
any additional terms contained in the acceptance, not expressly made
conditional on the acceptance of the additions by the original offeror,
become a part of the contract automaticallly, unless: (1) the offeror had
taken the precaution to limit expressly the acceptance to the terms of the
offer; or, (2) the additions would materially alter the offer; or, (3) the
offeror objects to the additions and gives notice before, or within a reason-
able time after, receiving notice of the additions.1" In any event, whether
we are dealing with merchants or not,'7 it is possible for an offer to be
accepted by an acceptance which varies the terms of the offer.
On the other hand when we are concerned with contracts not within
the scope of the Commercial Code, California law has been and is to the
effect that an acceptance, in order to operate as such and create a binding
contract, must not vary from or qualify the terms of the offer.' If there
is such a variance the purported acceptance amounts in law only to a
counteroffer which rejects and terminates the original offer'" and there
is no possibility of contract unless and until the counteroffer is itself
accepted. Again we have the situation where contracts subject to the
Commercial Code and those which are not2° are governed by different
rules of law. Since the modes of acceptance set out in the Commercial
Code are based on and designed to accomodate commercial practices,2 '
and sometimes only commercial practices "between merchants" which
developed apart from the general law of contracts, it seems that the
dichotomy will continue and that in this area we will have to contend with
two bodies of contract law.
Consideration is another area of change. Under the Commercial Code
with respect to the sale of goods we now have the concept of "firm offer."
This is an offer by a merchant 22 to buy or sell goods contained in a signed
writing which gives assurance that the offer will be held open. The Com-
mercial Code provides that such an offer is not revocable for lack of
consideration for the time stated, and if no time is stated then for a
reasonable time, but in no event will it be irrevocable for more than three
16 For definitions of "merchant" and "between merchants" see Cal. Comm. Code §2104.
1' Cal. Comm. Code §2207(2).
17 Parenthetically, we note that within the Commercial Code itself we have a Commercial
Code (between merchants) and a non-Commercial Code (between others).
18 Cal. Civ. Code §1585. Cf. Restatement, Contracts §60 (1932).
19 Apablasa v. Merritt & Co., 176 Cal.App.2d 719, 1 Cal.Rptr. 500 (1959).
20 We assume that if §§2207 and 10103 (general repealer) of the Commercial Code modify
§1585 of the Civil Code, the modification is only with respect to contracts for the sale of goods.
21 Cf. Cal. Comm. Code §1102.
22 "Merchant" is defined in Cal. Comm. Code §2104(1).
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months.2 As a precaution and in order to avoid a battle of forms the
section goes on to state that if the assurance is contained on a form sup-
plied by the offeree it must be separately signed by the offeror. This is new
California law. Until the adoption of the Commercial Code offers had to
be supported by consideration in order to make them irrevocable and
this was true of offers to buy and sell goods as well as offers relating to
other contracts. The Commercial Code does not affect those sections of
the Civil Code24 which allow revocation of an offer any time before
acceptance unless consideration had been paid to keep the offer open2"
or unless the doctrine of estoppel is applicable. 26 Consequently, in cases
where the Commercial Code is not applicable, absent any grounds for
applying estoppel, an offer will still need to be supported by consideration
in order to be irrevocable. Here, it should be noted that the Commercial
Code provisions relative to firm offers apply only to offers of relatively
short duration which are contained in signed writings. Apparently, there
is nothing to prevent an offeror from making his offer irrevocable beyond
three months if consideration is paid for it. Also, since the provision had
to do with signed writings, oral offers, to be irrevocable will still require
consideration.
The Commercial Code27 attempts to solve the familiar and vexing
problem of the pre-existing duty rule. Among other things it states that
an agreement modifying a contract for the sale of goods needs no con-
sideration to be binding. It also provides that a written agreement for
the sale of goods may only be modified by a written agreement or by an
oral agreement "fully" executed by both parties. This last provision is
similar to past and current California law2" except that in order to over-
rule a famous case2" it specifically provides that the oral agreement to be
an effective modification must be fully executed by both parties. However,
insofar as a written modification of a written contract needs no considera-
tion the law is new. One of the chief objections of doing away with the
necessity of consideration when a one-sided modification of an agreement
23 Cal. Comm. Code §2205.
24 Cal. Civ. Code §§1550, 1586.
25 Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal.2d 449, 122 P.2d 8 (1942).
26 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
27 Cal. Comm. Code §2209. California's Commercial Code varied from the Official Text in
§2209(2) and omitted §2209(3) of the Official Text. The latter required any contract as modi-
fied which was within the statute of frauds of the Commercial Code to satisfy the require-
ments of the statute of frauds.
28 Cal. Civ. Code §1698.
29 D. L. Godbey & Sons Const. Co. v. Deane, 39 Cal.2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 (1952), holding
that an oral agreement executed by only one of the parties was effective.
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is made is the hold-up aspect. Conceivably situations could arise wherein
one of the parties to a contract for the sale of goods could in bad faith
demand higher than the contract price. To obviate this and other bad
faith situations the Commercial Code3° provides that "Every contract or
duty within this code imposes an obligation of good faith in its perform-
ance or enforcement." The requirement of good faith is not new in contract
law in California, of course, but it seems certain that there will be diffi-
culty in determining what is or is not good faith when a contract subject
to the Commercial Code is modified without consideration in a situation
that would otherwise invoke the pre-existing duty rule.
Those contracts not subject to the Commercial Code, if oral, can be
modified in writing without new consideration as before;"' if written, they
can be modified either by an executed oral agreement 2 or by a contract
in writing, but in the latter case consideration is necessary.33 Once again
we have different rules depending upon whether the contract is subject to
the Commercial Code or not.
There are also some changes in the Commercial Code regarding the
statute of frauds. The stautory amount in contracts for the sale of goods
remains the same, i.e., the statute does not apply unless the price is $500
or more. 34 The statutory amount for choses in action under the Commercial
Code, however, is $5000.31 Previously it was $500." 6
The Commercial Code makes other changes, too. Formerly the memo-
randum, in order to suffice, had to be "a note[or memorandum in writing
of the contract of sale.""7 Now it is enough if there is a writing "sufficient
to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties. 38
Also the memorandum need not be complete and can omit or incorrectly
state material terms although a contract is not enforceable beyond the
quantity of goods stated in the writing. Thus, to be a sufficient memo-
randum under the Commercial Code the memorandum need only indicate
that a contract has been made; the writing must be signed; and the
writing must specify the quantity of goods involved. The word "signed,"
30 Cal. Comm. Code §1203.
31 Cal. Civ. Code §1697.
32 Price v. Price, 24 Cal.App.2d 462, 75 P.2d 665 (1938).
33 Cal. Civ. Code §1698; Krobitzsch v. Middleton, 72 Cal.App.2d 804, 165 P.2d 729 (1946).34 Cal. Comm. Code §2201(1).
35 Cal. Comm. Code §1206. (For statute of frauds relating to securities see §8319 and for
security agreements §9203.)
36 Cal. Civ. Code §1624a.
37 Cal. Civ. Code §§1624a & 1724, both repealed by the Commercial Code.
38 Cal. Comm. Code §2201(1).
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incidentally, is defined by the Commercial Code39 as including "any
symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenti-
cate a writing." This seems to be in accord with current California law.4"
Those contracts not subject to the Commercial Code continue to be
governed by the Civil Code with respect to the statute of frauds.4' More-
over, under the Civil Code a memorandum, in order to be sufficient, must
state with reasonable certainty each party to the contract, the subject
matter to which the contract relates, the terms and conditions of all the
promises and by when and to whom the promises are made.42 In short,
under the Civil Code the memorandum must be self sufficient in the sense
that it must contain all the terms of the contract and name the parties.
Under the Commercial Code if the memorandum indicates that a contract
has been made and specifies the quantity of goods, then the door is open
for oral evidence as to what the contract is. Thus it would seem that a
memorandum sufficient to meet the requirements of the Commercial Code
might fall far short of meeting the requirements of the Civil Code. This
might raise an interesting question if a contract is subject to the Com-
mercial Code statute of frauds because it is a contract for the sale of
goods for a price of more than $500, and also subject to the Civil Code
statute of frauds because it is a contract not to be performed within a
year from the making of the memorandum. Would or should the relaxed
requirements of the Commercial Code with respect to the sufficiency of
the memorandum be applicable in such a case?
As indicated above43 in discussing the preexisting duty rule, California's
version of the Commercial Code varies from the Official Text with respect
to agreements modifying an existing contract. The California version
states initially that "An agreement modifying a contract within this divi-
sion needs no consideration in order to be binding." This language is
broad enough to include oral modifications of oral contracts.44 The official
version of the Commercial Code contained a subsection45 which stated:
"The requirements of the statute of frauds section of the article (Section
2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its pro-
visions." This last quoted subsection was omitted from the California
3 9 Cal. Comm. Code §1201(39).
40 See Murphy v. Munson, 95 Cal.App.2d 306, 212 P.2d 603 (1949).
41 Cal. Civ. Code §1624.
42 Rivers v. Beadle, 183 Cal.App.2d 691, 7 Cal.Rptr. 170 (1960).
43 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
44See definitions of "agreement" and "contract," Cal. Comm. Code §§1201(3) and
1201(11) respectively.
45 Uniform Comm. Code §2-209(3), not enacted in California.
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Commercial Code. Does this mean that we could have a situation where
the original oral contract was unenforceable because of lack of a writing
but that the contract as orally modified without consideration is enforce-
able even though it is for the sale of goods for a price in excess of the
statutory amount? The section purports to deal with agreements to modify
contracts. It specifically requires either a writing or an oral agreement
fully executed by both parties to modify a written contract. Further, it is
silent as to the necessity of a writing in the case of modification of an
oral contract. In view of these factors, perhaps a plausible case could be
made to the effect that no writing is necessary. A court faced with such a
question might reason that insofar as the modified agreement is a contract
for the sale of goods for a price in excess of the statutory amount the
basic statute of frauds provision4" is applicable. It seems, however, that
to obviate such a problem it might have been wise to make specific refer-
ence to compliance with the Commercial Code's statute of frauds in the
case of agreements modifying contracts as did the Official Text.
There are two other situations in which the California Commercial
Code differs from the Official Text in dealing with the statute of frauds.
These are not changes in contract law but rather a change in the definition
of "goods" in one case and a change in the legal effect of pleading or
testimony in court with respect to the statute of frauds in the other.
In the first instance, the California Commercial Code,47 unlike the
Official Text, classifies timber as "goods" rather than real property no
matter which party to the contract of sale is to sever the timber. This was
deliberately done .in order to avoid a limitation on the amount that could
be loaned by national banks to finance timber cutting contracts. According
to the Comptroller of the Currency, the limitation (40 per cent) applies
only where a timber cutting contract under local law is a contract for the
sale of real property and not a contract for the sale of goods. By classify-
ing timber as goods the application of the limitation is avoided with
respect to California timber.
The other situation of change is found in the deliberate failure to in-
clude in the statute of frauds section of the California Commercial Code4 a
provision contained in the Official Text to the effect that if a party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or other-
wise in court that a contract was made, then the contract is enforceable
against him. The basis for this provision is the theory that once such an
46 Cal. Comm. Code §2201.
4 7 Cal. Comm. Code §2107(2).
48 Cal. Comm. Code §2201.
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admission is made the reason for the rule against enforcement disappears
since the purpose of the rule is to prevent enforcement of contracts not in
fact made. Because of some practical difficulties49 and also because such
a provision might tend to put a premium on perjured testimony to the
effect that no contract had been made the rule was not adopted in
California.
With respect to the statute of frauds the Commercial Code has also
adopted a special rule applicable "between merchants." 50 In effect it
states that if there is a written confirmation of a contract sent, which
would be a sufficient memorandum as against the sender, a failure to
answer the confirmation within ten days of receipt has the effect of making
the writing a sufficient memorandum as against both parties. Insofar as
this provision would allow one party to sign the memorandum and thus
bind the other party it is new contract law. It differs from the rule obtain-
ing in other contracts subject to the Commercial Code but not between
merchants. In that case the memorandum must be signed "by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker."" Also it differs from the rule which applies to contracts not
subject to the Commercial Code where the memorandum must be "sub-
scribed by the party to be charged or by his agent."52
The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation has always caused problems
for students of the law and despite the respectable authority to the effect
that there never was any real necessity for its adoption it appears to be
here to stay. Not surprisingly it is provided for in the Commercial Code.53
Basically the Commercial Code does not change California law except in
one particular. Under the Commercial Code when there has been an anti-
cipatory repudiation the aggrieved party "' may await performance by
the repudiating party for a "commercially reasonable time." 5 At the end
of a commercially reasonable time he has a duty to avoid resulting dam-
ages from that time on and if he does not he will not recover those
damages. On the other hand and with respect to contracts not subject to
the Commercial Code California law allows the non-repudiating party to
await performance until preformance is due under the terms of the con-
49 e.g. Does a demurrer constitute an admission?
50 Cal. Com. Code §2201(2).
51 Cal. Comm. Code §2201(1).
52 Cal. Civ. Code §1624.
53 Cal. Comm. Code §2610.
54 Cal. Comm. Code §1201(2).
55 Cal. Comm. Code §2610(a).
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tract.56 Thus, in some circumstances, a person whose repudiated contract
is subject to the Commercial Code .may not, without penalty anyway,
await performance until the contract performance date, whereas in those
contracts not subject to the Commercial Code he may. Perhaps this is an
area where the Civil Code ought to be changed. Certainly it seems un-
realistic and economically unsound to allow a non-repudiating party to
await performance even for a term of years if it happens to be a contract
wherein the date of performance will not arrive until then. A reasonable
time ought to be long enough for him to urge retraction and performance
if he desires to do so. But when he has had a reasonable time for this and
is unsuccessful, it seems just to require him to look elsewhere or in any
event to avoid resulting damages after this time.
Of course, the Commercial Code 7 allows the non-repudiating party to
pursue immediately any remedies available for breach if there has been
no timely retraction of the repudiation" and in this respect Commercial
Code contract law and non-Commercial Code contract law are the same.59
The Commercial Code also makes it clear that prospective inability to
perform can in some circumstances be treated as a repudiation.6" It pro-
vides that when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect. to
the other party's performance, the apprehensive party may demand ade-
quate assurance in writing that the other party will perform and can
suspend his own performance until such assurance is forthcoming. If such
assurance is not received within thirty days the failure to provide the
assurance constitutes a repudiation. The idea underlying this provision is
really the same as that underlying the former provisions of the Civil Code
with respect to stoppage in transit because of insolvency.61 However, the
Commercial Code remedy is new and can be used in a variety of circum-
stances other than insolvency.62 Further, it eliminates the necessity of
acting at one's, peril in differentiating between mere intervening impair-
ment of credit and insolvency. This is a realistic remedy. It is based on
the proposition that when people enter into a contractual relationship
they are actually and ultimately bargaining for whatever performance is
promised and each has an obligation to see that the other's expectancy
56 Cal. Civ. Code §1440.
57 Cal. Comm. Code §2610(b).
58 Cal. Comm. Code §2611.
59 Winegar v. Gray, 204 Cal.App.2d 303, 22 Cal.Rptr. 301 (1962).
60 Cal. Comm. Code §2609.
61 Cal. Civ. Code §§1777, 3076, 3077, all repealed by the Commercial Code.
62 See 37 J. State Bar Cal. 148, 149 (1962).
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is not impaired. Once that obligation is accepted63 then there is no hard-
ship in requiring an assurance of performance from one whose own actions
have given rise to the doubts. It seems that it would be wise to extend this
doctrine to contracts other than those covered by the Commercial Code. 64
The principal change in the Commercial Code with respect to damages
is in the cover provisions applicable to both buyer and seller." For ex-
ample, if there has been a repudiation the buyer can cover by purchasing
substitute goods from other sources. If he does so then the measure of
damages is the difference between the cost of the substitute goods pur-
chased and the contract price. Formerly the measure of damages was the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time set
for performance. The buyer is not required to cover, but if he does not,
he cannot recover any consequential damages which cover would have
prevented."6 The seller has a similar remedy, the right of resale, and if he
resells in good faith in a commercially reasonable manner then the
measure of damages is the difference between the resale price and the
contract price. Further the Commercial Code specifically provides that
the seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit he might make on
the resale. Once again the seller does not have to resell and if he does not
then the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price
and the market price at the time of performance under the contract. 67
What has been said so far sketches the more drastic changes in contract
law brought about by the California Commercial Code. No attempt has
been made to make the coverage all inclusive (and obviously anyone who
is involved with a case or a study affected by the Commercial Code must
do his own work). There are, of course, many concepts encompassed by
the Commercial Code which are about the same under the Code as they
were under statute and decision previously in California. Assignment of
rights and delegation of duties68 and the doctrine of impossibility of per-
formance and commercial frustration69 come immediately to mind. As a
matter of fact, it seems that the changes in contract law have not been
great, a matter which should be of some comfort to those who have labored
to master contract law in the pre-Commercial Code era.
63 As it has been in California, see Univrsal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20
Cal.2d 751, 128 P.2d 665 (1942).
64 Compare Restatement, Contracts §§318, 324 (1932) ; Cal. Civ. Code §1440.
65 Cal. Comm. Code §§2706 (cover by seller), 2712 (cover by buyer).
66 Cal. Comm. Code §2715(2) (a).
67 Cal. Comm. Code §2708; Cf. Cal. Civ. Code §§3353 (damage to seller), 3354 (damage
to buyer).
68 Cal. Comm. Code §2210.
69 Cal. Comm. Code §2615.
